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Our team embraces iGEM's spirit of innovation with a strong commitment to responsible research. We put safety and security at the center of our work - protecting people, our colleagues, and the environment - by designing, operating, and communicating responsibly.

Experimental safety :

As an iGEM team the biggest safety concern is the lab work, where it is crucial to have a clear understanding of the risk factors in play to ensure a successful and reproducible workflow. This is why we proactively map potential hazards in both our experiments and any future use, and we specify concrete countermeasures. To establish the needed safety measures, it is key to understand the specificities of the location and material we work with, as well as their limitations.

Lab setting and oversight

  • Biosafety level: BSL-1
  • Work areas: open bench for low-risk biological samples; chemical fume hood for volatile/hazardous chemicals
  • Institutional controls: accident reporting system; PPE (lab coats, gloves, closed shoes; goggles where appropriate); inventory tracking; physical access control to lab and storage; medical surveillance as required; waste management procedures
  • Training completed: lab access & rules, roles of responsible individuals, BSL differences, use of biosafety equipment, good microbial technique, disinfection & sterilization, emergency procedures, transporting samples, and physical biosecurity

Organisms, parts, and DNA screening

  • Engineered organism: Chlamydomonas reinhardtii
  • Supporting strain: Escherichia coli DH5-alpha for cloning only
  • New parts: assembly of new vectors/parts to express the lanthanide-binding protein (parts are not hazardous on their own)
  • DNA sourcing: all sequences ordered from a company that is a member of the IGSC, with sequence screening
  • Whitelist / permissions: work is covered by the iGEM White List; no prohibited activities and no activities requiring advance permission
  • No human subjects, animals, or environmental sampling beyond allowed sources

Experiments scope

  • Clone synthesized sequences in E. coli and assemble expression vectors
  • Transform Chlamydomonas reinhardtii
  • Measure protein expression and REE capture/recovery with mass-spectrometry quantification

Identified hazards

Biological and environmental

  • Potential ecological imbalance/biohazard if genetically engineered algae were to escape and establish outside containment.

Chemical

  • Ethidium bromide (suspected carcinogen) during gel electrophoresis.
  • Acrylamide (neurotoxic/carcinogenic in monomer form) for PAGE.
  • Methanol (toxic/flammable) in immunoblotting buffers.

Operational

  • Breakage or leakage of vessels/bioreactors; spills or leaks during handling/transport; accidental release by human error.

AI-related

  • Use of large language models and protein-structure prediction tools; risks include over-reliance on probabilistic predictions that may deviate from reality.

Risk management and mitigation

Design-for-safety (biocontainment)

  • Kill switches to trigger cell death outside defined conditions.
  • Engineer auxotrophy so strains depend on nutrients absent in natural environments.
  • Strict process containment: research only in closed systems; any future pilot in closed, onsite bioreactors at treatment plants.

Laboratory biosafety & biosecurity

  • Mandatory PPE; no food/drink; closed shoes and long pants.
  • Use open bench only for low-risk biology; use chemical fume hood for acrylamide (monomer), methanol, and other volatile solvents.
  • For EtBr a specialised fume hood with dedicated gloves and tools is allocated, to further limit any risk of accidental exposure to this carcinogen.
  • Inventory controls (who has what, where); physical access restrictions to lab and storage; accident reporting and medical surveillance per institutional policy.
  • Waste treatment: biological inactivation/decontamination before disposal; EtBr/acrylamide/methanol disposed via institutional hazardous-waste streams in labeled containers.

Chemical-specific controls (SDS-guided; high-level)

  • Ethidium bromide: nitrile gloves; dedicated EtBr station/containers; collect contaminated gel/tips in labeled waste.
  • Acrylamide: handle unpolymerized solutions in the fume hood with gloves; ensure complete polymerization before disposal where permitted.
  • Methanol: fume hood work; flammables storage; ignition-source control; spill kits available.

Operations & emergency readiness

  • Secondary containment for liquids; sealed, labeled transport.
  • Posted spill response and emergency procedures; routine refreshers.

Training & expert support

  • Team received safety/security training (topics listed above).
  • Consult EAWAG for environmental safety and deployment design.
  • Follow departmental safety officer guidance and institute standards for DNA stains and volatile solvents.

AI risk mitigation

  • Treat AI/structure-prediction outputs as hypotheses only; validate experimentally.
  • Keep records of prompts/outputs informing design; avoid AI-generated steps that conflict with institutional or iGEM policies.

Short risk register

Hazard Scenario Mitigation
Environmental establishment of engineered algae Culture escape or equipment failure Kill switch + auxotrophy, closed systems, site-contained bioreactors only, emergency plans, inspections
Ethidium bromide exposure Gel prep/cleanup Gloves, designated EtBr area, labeled waste, no skin contact
Acrylamide (monomer) Gel casting Fume hood, gloves, full polymerization before disposal
Methanol Buffer prep/blotting Fume hood, flammables cabinet, ignition control, spill kit
Vessel or bioreactor leak Breakage, human error Secondary containment, sealed transport, SOPs, incident reporting
Over-trusting AI predictions Design choices based only on models Treat as probabilistic, require experimental confirmation, documentation

Policies and guidelines

Future use & compliance

Field-like testing would only occur in the specialized, closed bioreactors at the wastewater plant to assess performance under real effluent conditions, since open release is prohibited. In Europe, such work requires prior authorization under EU Directive 2009/41/EC on contained use of GM microorganisms, along with approval from the national competent authority (e.g., Germany's BfR or France's HCB). Risk assessments, emergency plans, and regular inspections must be in place to demonstrate that the algae cannot escape into the wider environment.

*https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/41/oj

Policies in relevant countries

Being a team with people from multiple nationalities, we aim to investigate the possibility of a follow up on our project in a few different countries, more specifically France, Germany, and Switzerland. For both France and Germany this relies first hand on the fact that the activities are classified into risk classes 1-4 by EU Contained Use Directive 2009/41/EC. For European countries and Switzerland it also requires facility approval and activity notification/authorization before any further steps are taken. The typical is relatively similar, as the procedures have undergone a homogenisation on the European continent, but do have some key differences that we tried to underline in the following.

Switzerland

Who regulates? In Switzerland, contained use of GMOs is governed by the Containment Ordinance (SR 814.912). The Federal Office for the Environment (FOEN/BAFU) leads the process and operates the Ecogen portal/public register, with the Federal Office of Public Health (FOPH/BAG) covering human-health biosafety. Activities are filed as notifications for class 1-2 and authorizations for class 3-4 via the FOEN-coordinated process. Cantonal authorities may inspect and enforce the decisions taken.

Typical procedure

  • Classify the activity & organisms: do a written risk assessment; assign organisms to risk groups 1-4 and the planned work to activity classes 1-4.
  • Check facility suitability: confirm the lab/greenhouse/photobioreactor meets the required containment measures and documentation duties (SOPs, spill response, waste/effluent inactivation).
  • Notify or request authorisation. Classes 1-2: notification - you may start immediately once filed. Classes 3-4: authorisation required by FOEN or FOPH; start only after approval (typically valid for up to 5 years and renewable).
  • Keep records & update: maintain the risk assessment, notifications/authorisations, SOPs, training logs; reassess and update filings if organisms, scale, or installations change.

Sources: bafu.admin.ch, fedlex.admin

Germany

Who regulates? Applications for contained-use facilities and genetic engineering operations are processed by the competent authority of the federal state (Land) where the facility is located. For class 3-4 work, the federal ZKBS (Central Committee on Biological Safety) must be consulted for an opinion. ZKBS then provides risk assessments, containment level assignments, and organism guidance (including searchable microorganism database). For GM food/feed authorisation (not our case) the procedure is to go through the BfR (Bundesinstitut für Risikobewertung).

Typical procedure

  • Classify your activity and facility: identify organisms and vectors, scale, and operations. Use ZKBS guidance/database to support your risk class.
  • Get facility approved/registered at the required class (or confirm existing approval).
  • File the activity: class 1 usually requires notification; class 2 may need notification or authorization depending on the Land; classes 3-4 require authorization only with the ZKBS opinion.
  • Begin work only after the formal notice and keep approvals, SOPs, and training records on file.

Sources: bvl.bund.de, Bundesinstitut für Risikobewertung, zkbs-online.de

France

Who regulates? The ministry of research and higher education (MESR) is the competent authority for contained use in research/teaching. Contact points and portals are provided by MESR, with some deliberate release cases further scrutinised by the ministry of ecological transition.

Since 1 Jan 2022, France simplified some class 1 procedures and reorganized regulatory bodies. MESR now provides the operational guidance and handles filings.

Typical procedure

  • Classify activity (class 1-4) and prepare the risk assessment.
  • Obtain facility approval at the appropriate class.
  • File the activity: class 1-2 require declaration (simplified for class 1); class 3-4 need special authorization.
  • Submit via the MESR portal; wait for the decision or acknowledgment for class 1. Start only after approval and maintain registers, SOPs, training, and waste handling documentation.

Sources: French Public Health guidance, legifrance.gouv.fr, enseignementsup-recherche.gouv.fr

Real-world impact

This contained algal bioprocess aims to recover REEs safely from industrial/wastewater streams and may also reduce pollutant loads. The combination of genetic safeguards, physical containment, and institutional procedures keeps risks as low as reasonably achievable while enabling responsible innovation.

Safety in Human practices

Safety considerations guide our engagements with partners and communities. When we discuss potential deployments, we emphasise how containment designs, wastewater expertise from EAWAG, and institutional oversight shape the project roadmap. We document feedback, communicate realistic risk narratives, and plan to include findings from our interviews (including the EAWAG session) as soon as they are cleared for publication.